Introduction
In early January 2012 Jan Baas died. Baas was a member of the Dutch Senate
(
Eerste Kamer) for the conservative-liberal
VVD (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) from 1960 to 1981, and he gained
nationwide repute following a conflict with Hendrik Adams of the
Boerenpartij. The argument became so heated that
blows were exchanged. In the Senate Baas had requested the floor for
“personal business” (
een
persoonlijk feit), a special regulation in the Rules of Procedure
of the States General. Baas recounted his personal experiences with Adams during
the Second World War (WWII). The newly sworn-in senator Adams, said Baas, had
been his colleague at a state agricultural college during the war, where he had
been known as a supporter of the German occupier. During an argument about
Adams’ pro-Nazi conduct, Baas recounted, Adams had even threatened him with
deportation. Baas had contemplated at length whether he should stir up these
issues, which had occurred more than twenty years earlier:
Can it be justified to lay bare in public, during their lifetime, the past
of persons who were “wrong,” politically or otherwise?
After much hesitation I have answered this question affirmatively, if these
persons seek a position in the social order that, in terms of responsibility
and standing, they are, in my opinion, no longer entitled to. [1]
This, in short, was more than personal vindictiveness. Baas felt that
Adams had not rehabilitated himself sufficiently to be an equal participant in
political decision making.
[2]
Boerenpartij leader Hendrik Koekoek has
systematically emphasized that the big parties tried to isolate him by referring
to the
Boerenpartij as a kind of National
Socialist movement that was dominated by former Nazi-collaborators. Exposing
Adams in the Senate seemed to confirm this image. But was Koekoek right? Was his
party disqualified as “wrong” in Parliament and if so, how
was this done? In order to answer these questions we have used a new research
method that is possible because the Proceedings of the Dutch States General were
digitized some years ago, and the recently concluded project
War In Parliament made systematic and advanced
searches possible (see paragraph: methodological innovation).
[3] What is impossible by hand – finding every fragment in the
parliamentary debates that links the
Boerenpartij and “wrong” – does become possible with a
digital approach. This article is intended to contribute to the benefits of
digital methods to historians by exploring the advantages of using an advanced
search engine that can search large quantities of data. However, before we go
into the methodology in more detail, we have to introduce the
Boerenpartij in the historical and political setting
of the Netherlands in the 1950s and 1960s.
A Revolution from the Right
From the rise of Fascism in the 1920s in Italy to the Nazi-occupation of the
Netherlands (1940-1945), and then from the liberation up to the present day,
Dutch politicians have referred to the dangers of Fascism and Nazism. Referring
to Fascism and Nazism is still considered a tried-and-tested method to
stigmatize fellow-politicians and it could result in the effective exclusion of
parties.
[4] References to Fascism and
Nazism were also used to call attention to social wrongs.
[5]
Our focus in this article is on the
Boerenpartij, founded in 1958, that entered the House of
Representatives (
Tweede Kamer) with three seats
in 1963. For the first time since the fleeting electoral gain of the CPN
(Communist Party Netherlands) in 1946 the traditional centre parties ARP
(Anti-Revolutionary Party), CHU (Christian-Historical Union), KVP (Catholic
People’s Party), PvdA (Labour Party) and the conservative-liberal VVD (People’s
Party for Freedom and Democracy) had lost a considerable number of seats, this
time to a right-wing newcomer to the political stage. Earlier (extreme)
right-wing attempts had failed prematurely. Especially when parties were
portrayed in the news as assembly points for former Nazi-collaborators their
fate was quickly decided.
[6]
Hendrik Koekoek had, before he entered the political stage as leader of the
Boerenpartij, been a candidate for one of
the earlier right wing political attempts (the National Opposition Union, NOU).
One of the pacesetters within the NOU was engineer S.D. Rispens, a former member
of the National Socialist Movement, founded in 1931 and the only legal party
during the war years because of its pro-Nazi attitude. Rispens was convicted
after the war and deprived of the right to vote or run for office until 1957.
Another candidate was the previously mentioned Hendrik Adams, also an engineer
and convicted of collaboration. After the NOU fiasco Rispens and Adams searched
for opportunities for a new party, this time with men without a
“tainted past” as figureheads.
[7] A man like
Koekoek was totally compatible with this picture.
[8] Koekoek, depicted in 1958 in a secret internal memo of
the Ministry of Agriculture as an “a-political character” who
was “intellectually inferior” to Adams and Rispens,
[9] could not be linked to a “wrong” political past. He
managed to leave his mark on the
Boerenpartij.
This success was partly due to the unrest in the Dutch agriculture sector, which
was caused by the state reforms towards economies of scale and modernization.
This unrest came to a head just before the parliamentary elections of 1963.
In March 1963 an uprising broke out in a small village in the eastern province
of Drenthe, called Hollandscheveld. Three farmers, who had refused to pay their
contribution to the Agricultural board (
het
Landbouwschap), were threatened with eviction from their farms.
The Agricultural board was a statutory industrial organization, established in
1954, a collaboration between the agricultural sector and the government to
reform agriculture and horticulture. The resulting taxes and regulations
generated resistance, especially among the small farmers. Whereas before these
so-called “free farmers” had been punished by imposing fines,
the Agricultural board switched to more draconian measures in 1963. The courts
sanctioned a decision to remove the three farmers and their families from their
farms. This resulted in fierce opposition. Led by Farmers’ Party leader Koekoek
hundreds of sympathizers gathered in Hollandscheveld. They were met by police
who greeted them with tear gas and truncheons. Television images reached many
Dutch households. This did little for the reputation of the Agricultural board
and it definitely benefited the
Boerenpartij.
[10]
Koekoek presented himself as the political outsider who voiced the feelings of
discontent of the “average” Dutch citizen.
[11] Not only the small farmer could count on his support, as became clear
during the election campaign, but also others who were dissatisfied with the
political establishment and had right-wing sympathies. Koekoek’s political
agenda (against state bureaucracy, pro severe punishment of criminals and
against foreign “fortune seekers”) proved successful not only
in the countryside, but also in large cities. Predictions in the summer of 1966
said that in the case of new national elections the party could win as many as
twenty seats.
[12] In the sixties this would have meant a revolution, and contrary to
popular opinion, not a revolution from the left.
The Boerenpartij in the Spotlight
Twenty seats would never be realized. In the States-Provincial elections of
March 1966 the Boerenpartij did win 6.4% of the
votes, a considerable number that stirred great upheaval. In the municipal
elections two months later the success continued and the Boerenpartij joined the councils of several large cities,
including Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The elections were regarded as heralds of
great success in the coming parliamentary elections. In the turbulent year 1966,
when the newly founded political party D’66 (Democrats ’66) also created a stir
on the left wing, the traditional political system seemed to falter.
The
Boerenpartij received a lot of media
attention. Mostly criticism came from the left, but the right side openly
expressed support. Also in academia the
Boerenpartij became a hot topic. Academics concentrated on the
question of whether the ideas of the
Boerenpartij were fascist or not. The sociologist A.T.J. Nooij
wrote a dissertation based on the “F(ascism) scale”
developed by Theodor W. Adorno. Nooij used interviews with supporters of the
Boerenpartij and an ingenious computational
model to deliver hard scientific evidence of whether the supporters of the
Boerenpartij were right-wing extremists and
whether they constituted a fascist peril. In the end Nooij did not quite
succeed; his problem was finding the right definition of Fascism.
[13] Jaap van Donselaar, who published his book
Fout na de oorlog
(Wrong after the war) years later, had the same problem. According to
him there was no doubt that the supporters of the
Boerenpartij leaned towards fascist ideas, but whether the
Boerenpartij could be defined as fascist
remained difficult to determine.
[14]
More recently historian Koen Vossen positioned the
Boerenpartij in the changing political landscape of the 1960s. He
did not zoom in on the left, but rather on the right. According to Vossen the
Boerenpartij should be viewed as one of the
parties “in the broader spectrum of right-wing
populist parties as it existed in the 1960s and that could, due to societal
changes, once again flourish.”
[15] Vossen’s focus was not so much on the question of how
“wrong” the
Boerenpartij
was; rather, he pointed out the depth of the impact of the Adams affair on the
Boerenpartij. Without this affair, Vossen
writes, the party might have won the predicted twenty seats in the elections.
But:
In the heated climate of 1966,
when the 1940-1945 traumas kicked up again, the Boerenpartij epitomized the presumed continued effect of the
fascist mentality, especially for progressive young people. In public
meetings of the Boerenpartij the presence
of young demonstrators who wanted to nip the fascist danger in the bud was
now almost standard. [Vossen 2005, 246]
So Vossen attributes the beginning of the decline of the
Boerenpartij to extraparliamentary actions. In this
article we take a look at the parliamentary side of the story by investigating
whether and if so
in what way the
Boerenpartij was linked with fascism and national
socialism (“wrong”) in the parliamentary debates. In this way we hope to
gain more insight into the degree to which the parliamentary discourse may have
contributed to the fall of the
Boerenpartij.
Methological Innovation
The National Library of the Netherlands (
Koninklijke
Bibliotheek) in The Hague has digitized the Proceedings of the
States General. However, searching this huge database (approx. 2.5 million
pages) has its limitations because it does not allow certain complex queries.
With the search engine that was developed in the earlier mentioned War in
Parliament project this is now possible.
[16] In this project the parliamentary debates from 1930 through 1995 were
opened up, which means that text fragments can be “harvested” on the
document level (from a specific debate) as well as on the person level
(belonging to a specific speaker).
To make this possible all debate transcripts were converted into semi-structured
XML documents. In these documents the debates are recorded in a hierarchy of
debate subjects (topics), consisting of a series of speakers (scenes), which in
turn are made up of speeches (chronological, starting with the main speaker and
followed by any interruptions and rebuttals). Every speech consists of
paragraphs. This structure of topics, scenes, speeches and paragraphs is
introduced by a computer-directed analysis of implicit information present in
the original documents, such as blank lines, standard formulations, headings and
typeface. In the older documents the topics are composed directly from speeches
(without the intermediate layer of scenes). Each fragment from the documents
generated in this way has its own unique identifier (up to the paragraph level),
which can be used to determine its position in the hierarchy as well as to
retrieve the fragment in question from the database.
All speeches were subsequently annotated with information regarding the speaker,
political party, and role of the speaker. With the combination of speaker’s name
from the original document, date of session, and chamber (Senate - House of
Representatives) we managed to find in 98.5% of all speeches a unique speaker in
the politician database we constructed with data from
www.parlement.com. Based on
biographical information a party name could then also be added. All data was
placed in an open-source database (eXist) with open-source search technology
(Lucene). This enables users to carry out searches on the fully indexed text.
Together with the hierarchical structure of the data we can search on the word
level and filter results on politician name, name of a party, speaker’s role,
date, Senate and House of Representatives, and make combinations.
Capturing the historical information we were looking for was a challenge,
because references to WWII were imprecise and often hidden. To put it
differently, WWII was (and is) most of the time not a
“natural” topic in parliamentary debates, due to the fact
that WWII is part of the collective memory of Dutch society, thus references to
this period could be found in every debate. This is the reason why we
experimented with two different Boolean search strategies, instead of using more
complex classification methods (i.e. machine learning techniques) which proved
to be unsuccessful.
The first broad search strategy consisted of formulating a number of search
queries that were linked. The goal of this strategy was to combine result sets
that would yield a single result set of relevant hits. We cast a wide net, so to
speak: all potentially relevant words as they could occur in the spoken text
when the subject was “wrong” were combined in the query:
fascis* OR NSB OR “
politiek delinquent
” OR “
politieke delinquent
” OR “
politieke delinquenten
” OR collaborat* OR “
nationaal socialisme
” OR “
nationaal socialistisch
” OR “
nationaal socialistische
” OR antisemitis* OR oorlo* OR Hitler OR
Mussert OR Roskam OR Boerenleider OR Jeugdstor* OR NSK* OR Waffen-S* OR
Landstand
This yielded two result sets for the period 1963-1981 (the
entire parliamentary term of the
Boerenpartij).
The first result set contained all references to “wrong” by the speakers of
the
Boerenpartij and yielded 178 hits. The
second result set contained all references to “wrong” of all other parties
and yielded 7662 hits. It should be mentioned that there can be more than one
hit in a debate (topic) or even in a speaker (scene), because each of the
queries mentioned above is “harvested” at the speech level. Also important
to mention is that during the writing of this article (July/August 2012) it is
not yet possible to reproduce the query via the publicly accessible web
interface of the search engine. This is due to a limit on the use of the
“wildcard” (*) that is necessary at present to avoid server overload, a
technical obstacle that will be remedied in the near future.
A second widely cast net led to a result set of all references to the
Boerenpartij by others than
Boerenpartij members:
Boerenpartij OR Adams OR Koekoek OR Voogd OR Brake OR Harmsen OR Harselaar
OR Bossche OR Koning OR Kronenburg OR Leffertstra OR Nuijens OR
Verlaan
This query resulted in 12,204 hits.
The combination of both queries “wrong” and “
Boerenpartij
” excluding the Boerenpartij (which we
already had with 178 hits) yielded 179 hits.
The set of 179 hits we subsequently examined for relevance. This was necessary
because search terms like “oorlo*” (war), for example, did not result in
relevant fragments (“war” yes, but not the Second World War). Noise was not
restricted to war-related search terms.
The search for persons (the members of the Boerenpartij) also generated noise. In a query a distinction must
be made between searching for persons who have said something, and searching for
persons who are mentioned. The first is relatively easy. As the structure of
parliamentary reports has remained fairly consistent through the years, it was
possible - despite the necessary OCR (optical character recognition) errors - to
detect the announcement of speakers in nearly every case, and identify the
speaker by matching speaker name and party name with a database of politicians
with precise session days and party memberships. In this way a distinction can
be made between the Christian-Democrat politician Jan de Koning, the liberal
H.E. Koning, and J. de Koning of the Boerenpartij. In the second case, in which the search is for
persons mentioned in the spoken text this is not yet possible, because such
identification will depend on the context of what is said. A search query on
“Koning” will yield many non-relevant results. The search engine is not
able to distinguish between the three “Konings” solely on the basis of the
text.
Noise is a major obstacle in this study, partly as a result of the Boolean
search method. What was impossible during the term of the project due to the
one-year time limit, i.e. limiting the noise, is still an ambition for the
future. This could be done for example, through more advanced search techniques,
such as using statistical language models on the content of the debate text in
order to make a classification of speeches that do or do not address a specific
topic. Another way of addressing this problem could be clustering speeches based
on the relevance of words within a speech with regard to a specific topic, where
different algorithms are available to calculate this “relevance.” However,
this is not off-the-shelf technology and requires more time to implement.
However, even that would not solve the problems. Qualitative analysis of the
results will still remain a prerequisite to finding an answer to the question if
and especially how the Boerenpartij was linked with “wrong,” as we will explain
below in the analysis of the results. It is the context that determines the
relevance of a reference. Concretely, and this is essential, this means that
every hit must be examined, making the (too) extensive result sets (thousands of
hits) too labour intensive.
Knowledge of historical details on the subject also proved necessary. The search
term “Holocaust,” for example, does not yield results before 1978, because
this name for the murder of the Jews only became established after the American
docudrama series Holocaust. This does not mean,
however, that the persecution of the Jews was not discussed before 1978. A term
like “political delinquent,” on the other hand, was used mainly in the
period 1945-1955 and slowly vanished over the following years to be replaced
with words like “ex-national-socialist” or even “war criminal.”
After our first search strategy and the assessment of the hits on the
combination of the queries “wrong” and “
Boerenpartij,
” the question emerged whether we had now found all relevant hits. To check
this we employed a second search strategy. It consisted of a series of specific
queries that were continually adapted and compared:
Search query |
Period |
Speaker |
Party |
Hits |
boerenpa* AND fascis* |
1958-1982 |
[not defined] |
[not defined] |
17 |
fascis* |
1958-1982 |
[not defined] |
[not defined] |
18 |
boerenpa* AND nationaalsocia* |
1958-1982 |
[not defined] |
[not defined] |
0 |
boerenpa* AND nazi* |
1958-1982 |
[not defined] |
[not defined] |
8 |
boerenpa* AND nazi* NOT fascis* |
1958-1982 |
[not defined] |
[not defined] |
5 |
boerenpa* AND NSB |
1958-1982 |
[not defined] |
[not defined] |
4 |
boerenpa* AND NSB NOT fascis* |
1958-1982 |
[not defined] |
[not defined] |
2 |
boerenpa* AND NSB NOT nazi* |
1958-1982 |
[not defined] |
[not defined] |
3 |
boerenpa* AND NSB NOT nazi* NOT fascis* |
1958-1982 |
[not defined] |
[not defined] |
1 |
Koekoek AND fascis* |
1958-1982 |
[not defined] |
[not defined] |
14 |
Koekoek AND fascis* NOT boerenpa* |
1958-1982 |
[not defined] |
[not defined] |
8 |
Koekoek AND nazi* NOT fascis* NOT boerenpa* |
1958-1982 |
[not defined] |
[not defined] |
6 |
Koekoek AND NSB NOT nazi* NOT fascis* NOT boerenpa* |
1958-1982 |
[not defined] |
[not defined] |
5 |
NSB OR nazi* OR fascis* |
1958-1982 |
Koekoek |
[not defined] |
18 |
fascis* OR nazi* |
1958-1982 |
Adams |
[not defined] |
0 |
Adams |
1958-1982 |
[not defined] |
[not defined] |
96 |
adams AND oorlog |
1958-1982 |
[not defined] |
[not defined] |
11 |
boerenpa* AND fout |
1958-1982 |
[not defined] |
[not defined] |
34 |
collaborat* |
1958-1982 |
[not defined] |
[not defined] |
69 |
collaborat* |
1958-1982 |
[not defined] |
Boerenpartij |
1 |
antisemitis* |
1958-1982 |
[not defined] |
[not defined] |
107 |
antisemitis* |
1958-1982 |
[not defined] |
Boerenpartij |
3 |
antisemitis* AND boerenpar* |
1958-1982 |
[not defined] |
[not defined] |
3 |
boerenpar* AND wereldoorlog |
1958-1982 |
[not defined] |
[not defined] |
15 |
Koekoek AND wereldoorlog |
1958-1982 |
[not defined] |
[not defined] |
9 |
Table 1.
List of the specific search queries
[17]
This method of searching and comparing results eventually produced twenty
relevant hits, with a clear peak in 1966, the year of the Adams affaire, with
eight hits. As the query was small every time, it was easy to experiment, which
resulted in interesting and not directly sought results. References to
“Fascism” for example, came from the communist CPN side a
disproportional number of times: of the 499 references to Fascism between 1958
and 1982, 177 were made by the CPN, meaning that this small party was
responsible for a third of the total number. The Boerenpartij referred to Fascism 18 times. Not once did the
Boerenpartij refer to “national
socialism” in the relevant period and only 3 of the 208 times was
“anti-Semitism” mentioned by the Boerenpartij.
Both the specific and the broad search strategy finally resulted in the same
(relevant) hits and can therefore be considered (reasonably) reliable; however,
it should be mentioned that 100% completeness (recall) cannot be guaranteed. The
search engine indexes the source documents on the word level, and errors can
occur due to the earlier mentioned OCR errors, unknown spelling variations, and
ambiguity due to wrongly interpreted punctuation marks and hyphens. One example
is the comparison that senator Algra from the Anti Revolutionary Party (ARP)
made on 25 May 1965 between NSB and Boerenpartij. The search engine missed this hit in both
strategies because in the text NSB was followed by a comma instead of a full
stop (N.S.B,).
The fact that we found this debate anyway underscores that results by search
engines retrieved from scans of historical documents to some degree remain more
unreliable even after the most careful OCR corrections than born digital
documents. Scanned documents are as unique as their originals: one small
compositor error, a small layout change, is copied on the scan and is not always
detectable even with the latest of techniques and best corrections. Unlike the
current digital Parliamentary reports, which are much easier to read for search
engines, any piece of paper that was scanned by the Koninklijke Bibliotheek has its own uniqueness, as does anything
that was preserved in the pre-digital era. This is important when the
possibilities and impossibilities of digital historical research are at issue:
if a relatively standardized corpus like the Proceedings is accompanied by so
much uncertainty, then digitized archives will present an even
larger challenge.
Parliamentary Mores
What did the result sets yield with regard to content? The first link between
“wrong” and the
Boerenpartij in the
Proceedings was 19 November 1963, during the approval of the budget of the
Ministry of the Interior. Koekoek complained that the Dutch Secret Service (BVD)
had listened in on him and that a letter had been stolen. He presented himself
as a victim of the establishment that discredited him as a right-wing extremist.
[18]
Koekoek did not present clear evidence, but was indirect and not very concrete.
This resulted in an awkward debate between him and the conservative-liberal
Minister of the Interior Edzo Toxopeus, in which Toxopeus rejected Koekoek’s
allegations as vague and insinuating. For Koekoek, however, the issue was that
he was made out to be “wrong” and a danger to the state. J.H.
Scheps, a World War Two resistance fighter and a heavyweight within the labour
party, intervened by pointing out that nobody thought Koekoek was
“wrong,” but that Koekoek did have to back up his
allegations with evidence. Otherwise, according to Scheps,
We will return to the atmosphere we knew in the years when the N.S.B.
started and when all manner of forces weakened the essential value of
parliament. All those individuals who are reputed to stand up for the people
at that time proved what it means when the powers of parliament are
weakened. [19]
Here the connection with “wrong” consisted of a referral to a
mentality and procedure that were “wrong,” not to
“wrong” political positions or ideologies. This
observation clearly underlines the importance of qualitative analysis. In
Scheps’ eyes the
Boerenpartij acted
“wrong” rather than was “wrong.”
In May 1965 anti-revolutionary representative H. Algra, also a former resistance
fighter, tried a slightly different tack in the Senate. He compared the success
of the
Boerenpartij to the success of the NSB
in the 1930s, a consequence of feelings of distrust and dissatisfaction with
government policies among part of the electorate. Algra hastened to say that
this obviously was not enough reason to put both parties on a par, but felt a
warning was in order.
[20]
Marcus Bakker, leader of the communist party (CPN), went a little further during
the Budget Debate on 12 October 1965. In his opinion the government elicited
fascist thinking from the
Boerenpartij with its
policies, thereby stimulating political instability.
[21] Koekoek replied the next day that the
Boerenpartij had nothing to do with Fascism:
Mr Bakker brought it up. Now let him prove – he has every opportunity to
do so – that we have anything to do with the N.S.B., and that we have
anything to do with fascism. I can sit back and wait confidently, because I
can declare in advance, that we do not. Regardless of how well he can speak
his piece, he will certainly not be able to get out of this one, even if he
has an hour to do so. [22]
The remarkable dynamics of accusing and demanding evidence, that would
prove characteristic of the debates regarding Koekoek and his party, started to
take shape.
Up to that point attacks on the Boerenpartij in
the debates had focused on its unparliamentary conduct and rabble-rousing that
was reminiscent of the NSB. But the Adams affair that started after the 1966
summer recess was of a different nature: here a Boerenpartij senator’s national socialist past was exposed. This
was no longer about NSB-like methods but about a former collaborator who thought
he could return to the political arena without reflection on his war past.
Without an advanced search engine we could also have found the debates regarding
Adams. What we would not have discovered, however, is that the Adams affair was
a (once-only) break with the way in which members of parliament had treated the
Boerenpartij so far. Only this affair was
literally about “wrong”
Boerenpartij-politicians and the key question
was on what conditions a former political delinquent was allowed to participate
in national politics again. All other references (before and after) were
insinuations about the political conduct of the members of the Boerenpartij that leans towards or plays into the
hand of Fascism.
In fact, our project is a clear example of a combination between a quantitative
(give me all references to x) and qualitative (what does x mean by close
reading) approach.
Fascist Farmers
The State-Provincial elections on 20 September 1966 resulted in the installation
and swearing in of the new members of the Senate. Immediately following this
official ceremony VVD-senator Baas was given the floor on “personal
business.” It stood to reason, Baas argued, “ that we would welcome the members of [the
Boerenpartij] and treat them like our new
colleagues. ”
[23] However, the war past of one of them made this impossible. This person
was Hendrik Adams, whom Baas had met in his position as teacher at a state
agricultural college. In class, Baas said, Adams had “systematically propounded his ideas” on the importance of
collaborating with the occupier. In 1944 the situation escalated and Adams had
threatened Baas with the words: “I, Adams, will
make sure you are deported as soon as possible.” These words echoed
in his mind for many years, Baas said: “More
than 20 years later our paths cross again. You will understand, Mr
President, that I am not able to be amicable towards Mr Adams”
[24]
The truth was out: Baas could not accept Adams as a colleague; the rift caused
during the war was not yet mended. According to Baas, Adams had in no way
expressed regret for his “wrong” attitude during the war.
“If I believed,” said Baas, “that Mr Adams understands why he was convicted and
lost the right to vote, and that he had come to the realization that he was
wrong, then I might have been able to forgive him.”
[25]
The bomb exploded after the Senate session ended. “Boiling with anger [Adams] entered the coffee room of the
Senate,” Baas later explained, “and
stormed towards me. ‘You miserable oaf…’ he shouted, among other
things. And then I thumped him.”
[26] The scuffle, which was widely reported in the newspapers, shows the
emotion of the renewed confrontation between people who had been each other’s
enemies during the occupation years under a very different balance of power. At
moments like these the question of conditions for renewed forms of living
together between former “right” and
“wrong” citizens became urgent.
On 4 October Adams was given the opportunity to defend himself, and was
unsuccessful. Adams evaded the accusations, believed that there was a conspiracy
against the Boerenpartij, and refused to
apologize for his pro-Nazi behaviour during WWII.
For Baas a demonstration of regret was a necessary precondition to be able to
accept a former collaborator as a colleague in parliament. During the
“personal business” speaking time Adams had been given
the opportunity to do this: distance himself from his “wrong”
past and show that he had reformed. As he had not, Baas felt the “former political delinquent Adams” lacked
“every personal right to be a member of this
Senate”: “ For other political parties
too things would have been different had Adams admitted that he was
‘wrong’ during the war. ”
Instead, Adams emerged from the debate as an incorrigible national socialist
collaborator and cowardly traitor, as well as an anti-Semite [during the war he
wrote for an anti-Semitic magazine] of the worst kind. In fact, Adams’ political
death sentence was already signed. On 25 October 1966, in the Senate, Adams’
letter of resignation was read:
The unworthy and above all unlawful treatment, which I have been forced to
endure during the previous two sessions, in a hostile atmosphere from all
Dutch political parties and under your & – not very authoritative &
– leadership, is unacceptable to any honest Dutchman and it is only on the
basis of this consideration that I hereby inform you of my withdrawal as
officially elected representative of the Boerenpartij in this Senate. [27]
The Senate took note of Adams’ missive. Although the turmoil continued outside
parliament for some time and schisms led the
Boerenpartij into hot political waters, there were very few
references to Adams in either the Senate or the House of Representatives.
[28] The dividing lines were drawn clearly: former collaborators who did not
publicly renounce their war past were not accepted in the highest political
bodies. And, as shown by the motion of no-confidence against Koekoek,
politicians who did not appreciate this could count on severe disapproval. Did
Adams’ retreat also mean the end of the connection that was made between the
Boerenpartij and “wrong?” It’s time to
draw some conclusions.
First of all, up to the Adams affair in the autumn of 1966 the Boerenpartij was not associated in Parliament with a
fascist ideology, but was “merely” accused of a
“wrong” mentality; the conduct of Koekoek and associates
allegedly showed the non-acceptance of parliamentary mores and rules, which was
reminiscent of the undemocratic conduct of the NSB in the 1930s.
Secondly, the Adams affair meant a rift in the political discourse about the
Boerenpartij. An alleged
“wrong” mentality was no longer the issue. The affair
demonstrated a totally different aspect of the link between “wrong” and
Boerenpartij: the discussions about Adams
showed the unwritten conditions that former collaborators had to meet in order
to be allowed back into political decision making. Adams was unable to stand his
ground because he would not renounce his past. In fact, he made it clear he did
not regard his war past as “wrong.” The fact that Koekoek
stood by him and attempted to expose politicians in other parties as
“wrong,” almost resulted in political suicide.
The third conclusion is that after 1966 hardly any links were made in Parliament
between the Boerenpartij and “wrong.” This
begs the question whether the rejection of Adams also served another purpose,
namely to render the Boerenpartij harmless.
Disqualifying political opponents with a reference to the Second World War was
(and is) an effective means to do so. Based on our findings we may state that
the association with a “wrong” mentality by itself had little
political effect. The Boerenpartij continued to
grow in the period between 1963-1966. However, when a concrete person was
convincingly exposed as “wrong” and the party did not
unambiguously distance itself from this individual, electoral success
evaporated.
As the first two conclusions are the result of interpretation of the gained
results (close reading), the third – no links between the Boerenpartij and “wrong” – couldn’t have been drawn without
a digital approach, and is promising for further historical research. More
research would benefit our understanding of political transition periods and the
relationship between electoral success of newcomers to the political scene and
the attempts of the “old” parties to disqualify their
intentions.
Lessons Learned
Unfortunately, digitized sources are generally used in much the same way as the
originals. The advantage of digitization is then limited to easy access (no more
trips to the university library) and to finding what you are looking for (a
particular debate or speaker) more quickly. The state-of-the-art search engine
that was developed in the War in Parliament project enabled the combination of
several search queries in order to systematically check if, and if so, in what
way the Boerenpartij was linked to “wrong”
in the parliamentary debate. In other words, in this project we did more than
just speed up our research by formalizing our research question. During this
process the “War in Parliament” pilot project has
taught us some valuable lessons.
The first lesson concerns the nature of the information that one looks for in
the context of studying references to WWII in general, and in this particular
case the relationship between the
Boerenpartij
and “wrong.” With the exception of debates that explicitly concern WWII
(debates about the release of war criminals, pensions for war victims etc.).
WWII tends to be a very
implicit topic in the parliamentary
debates. References are often made in passing and some are very hard to capture.
This is one of the reasons why machine-learning techniques with which we
experimented (see above) failed. The second lesson was that the relevant phrases
are time-specific (Holocaust, political delinquents) and semantically ambiguous.
To give just one example of semantic ambiguity: “
bezetting
” (occupation) in the sense of the German occupation of the Netherlands
between 1940 and 1945 also harvested references to the occupation of
departments, hospital beds etc. So, the need for close reading remains a
prerequisite to gaining the relevant results.
[29]
The big challenge is therefore how to improve retrieval performance. In a
proposal we submitted to the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research
this year, and in which the digital approach is crucial to harvesting our
results, we build explicitly on the experiences gained in War in Parliament.
[30] In this proposal, and in addition to the current state-of-the-art
Boolean query suggestions, we plan to add three key extensions aimed at
improving the suggestions and thereby the retrieval system’s effectiveness. One
way is to include synonym structure, either user-contributed, corpus-generated
or extracted from a dictionary or back-of-the-book-indexes (e.g. knowledge based
enrichment). The second addition is semantic in nature; from experiments
involving media studies researchers, we know that semantically informed search
suggestions (based e.g., on people, organizations and locations) are key to
exploratory searches in digital humanities. We aim to integrate such suggestions
within the proposed Boolean query suggestion environment.
[31] We will visualize such semantic suggestions in term clouds to analyze
them. Finally, the third addition, is to make Boolean query suggestions
time-aware.
[32] References to WWII were, as reported above, not only implicit in many
cases, they were also subject to trends (changes in vocabulary). Terms that make
good query suggestions during one period may not be very effective during
another. The insights gained in time-awareness will be integrated into the query
suggestion process through a combination of time series analysis (of term
frequencies) and co-occurrence analysis. With these improvements, we hope we’ve
found a solution for the main problems experienced in the War in Parliament
project.
This is the more important, because WWII has been the most powerful benchmark of
political morality in post-war Western societies, and political elites were (and
still are) in permanent need to relate to the defining experiences of warfare,
political oppression and genocide. An interdisciplinary approach will provide us
with models for a better understanding of that past. Extensive usage and further
development of existing text-mining tools will enable us to address questions
about political transition periods (in this article a new right-wing party
entering the political stage) and whether or not there is a relationship between
the utilization of WWII as a political argument and these transitions. A digital
approach, as we have seen, facilitates the analysis of large text corpora over
long time periods.
We want to conclude this article with a remark on the
conditions
which are needed to conduct digital historical research. This is all the more
important because it is a much neglected subject, not only in the scholarly
literature but also by technical utopianists who push for a revolution in the
humanities. The Dutch Academy for Sciences (KNAW), for instance, launched an
innovative programme for the humanities that primarily focuses on tools. In this
journal, the Swedish scholar Patrick Svensson, who can hardly be accused of
scepticism towards digital innovations, wrote in 2012: “‘While the ideas of grand challenges and big humanities
certainly have attraction and require forward thinking in order to identify
complex problems and large-scale visions, we should be careful not to
uncritically accept the frame of big humanities, which, for instance, has a
tendency to be coupled with a positivist agenda and a homogenization of the
humanities.’”
[33]
Besides the danger of homogenization of the humanities, which means here the
desire to emphasize on quantitative criteria in the humanities and thus to
squeeze out the qualitative (and therefore less measurable) ones, we need to
realize that digital source material is a prerequisite to apply text-mining
techniques. This may sound like we are stating the obvious, but we are not; in
practice much of the material is still in analogue form, and can therefore not
be searched using text-mining techniques. At NIOD, for example, less than three
percent of the total archival material has been digitized. If the large-scale
version of the methodological innovation is to be successful, mass digitization
of paper collections is inevitable. This step is in danger of being skipped
because there is so much focus on the more “sexy” development
of tools.
Furthermore, much archival material is in formats that either cannot be
transcribed at all as text [e.g. graphical material] or which has only been
digitized as a page image but has not been transcribed as text [e.g. page images
of manuscript materials or documents that for various reasons cannot be
processed with OCR]. This means that digitization of this material can help us
retrieve certain information more easily, but it will remain necessary to
analyse results by hand at a rather low level. But given these challenges, the
success of methodological innovation first and foremost depends on digitization
of paper collection for which there is often no money or no will (or both).
However, if this isn’t done, only a small number of historians will get involved
in the much needed discussions on the improvement of digital techniques to
conduct historical research.