Abstract
In Refiguring Minds in Narrative Media (2015), David
Ciccoricco employs an impressive range of contemporary science on cognition,
memory, and emotion to update our narratological theory so that we might be
better equipped to read minds in printed fiction, digital fiction, and video
games. In doing so, Ciccoricco expands the remit of the burgeoning field of
cognitive literary studies, which despite its recent growth remains largely
focused on print fiction published before the 20th century. Refiguring Minds is an exemplary work of cognitive literary studies
which showcases both the field’s weaknesses and its strengths. While Ciccoricco
sometimes tends towards reductionism — a problem in any scientifically-inflected
field of literary study — he also enriches our understanding of the cognitive
processes in fictional characters and in ourselves as we engage with those
fictional minds.
Cognitive literary studies has become increasingly established as a discipline, its
rise marked by landmark studies such as Lisa Zunshine’s
Why We
Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel (2006) and Alan Richardson’s
British Romanticism and the Science of Mind (2001).
Yet its focus is still largely on print fiction published before the twentieth
century. In
Refiguring Minds in Narrative Media, David
Ciccoricco addresses this imbalance, expanding the field to cover not only some
twentieth-century print fiction but digital fiction and video games as well. Though
Ciccoricco recognises that “what we call ‘cognitive literary
studies’ can by all means operate as one literary-critical
approach among many”
[
Ciccoricco 2015, 16], he also begins by making the fair case that literary studies in general
should move on from its outdated reliance on the psychoanalytic idiom which has
dominated it in the twentieth century. His study addresses cognitive literary
studies specifically, but one of Ciccoricco’s aims is to contribute to the larger
ongoing re-evaluation of the “mistaken mechanisms and flawed foundations” of
the Freudian model of the unconscious, memory, and repression [
Ciccoricco 2015, 16]. Almost twenty years after the first excited
manifestos for cognitive literary studies, Ciccoricco’s book soberly demonstrates
that literary studies need not necessarily aim to run alongside the
“cutting-edge” of cognitive science, but it has to at least
be responsibly “
current”
[
Ciccoricco 2015, 16].
The book as a whole serves as a strong example of how literary studies might
productively draw on the contemporary sciences of mind. Ciccoricco is extremely
diligent throughout, and his assimilation and explication of a wide range of
cognitive reading alone will make his study hugely beneficial to others working in
the burgeoning field. His cognitive research is matched by an equally impressive
engagement with both long-established and very new narratological and literary
theory. One of the central theoretical problems with which Ciccoricco opens his
study concerns the relationship between representation and simulation. As Ciccoricco
explains, “digital media push the project of cognitive literary and
narrative theory into new (kinetic, cybernetic, ludic) territory”
[
Ciccoricco 2015, 15]. Once we begin to read minds in other media, we have to ask new questions
about how those minds are both represented to, and enacted within, the
reader/player. This complex theoretical area is the thread with which Ciccoricco
subtly ties the whole study together.
The book is divided into two parts, “Attention and
Perception” and “Memory and Emotion.” Each
part contains three chapters, the first of which explains an exemplary work of
printed literature, the second a digital fiction, and the third a video game. In the
first chapter Ciccoricco rereads Patrick White’s
The Solid
Mandala (1966), a novel about the relationship between twins. While
acknowledging that White’s novel was informed by Jungian psychology, and that Jung
is therefore a necessary figure for understanding the novel (which has been the
approach taken in much of its criticism), Ciccoricco demonstrates the potential of
updating “prevailing literary-critical treatments of the (Freudian and Jungian)
unconscious” with the more contemporary model of the “adaptive
unconscious” popularised in particular by Timothy D. Wilson [
Ciccoricco 2015, 35]. In this chapter, which is grounded in
careful use of interdisciplinary terms such as social psychology’s
“attribution” (denoting the “
psychological act of assigning mental
states”
[
Ciccoricco 2015, 53]), Ciccoricco develops a persuasive reading of the novel that accounts for the
way that one of the twins, Arthur — like the reader — is persuaded by his brother’s
misattributions of Arthur’s own mental life.
The second chapter is devoted to Young-Hae Chang Heavy Industries (YHCHI)’s “The Last Day of Betty Nkomo” (2005), which, like most
digital fictions, implicitly challenges our “traditional reading practices”
[
Ciccoricco 2015, 72] and our ways of talking about reading. Building on recent criticism around
reading practices, such as N. Katherine Hayles’s distinction between deep and hyper
attention, Ciccoricco challenges the popular view that a digital fiction such as
“Betty Nkomo” — which flashes “150-odd screens” in
the space of “one minute and twelve seconds”
[
Ciccoricco 2015, 82] describing the death of an “ill or elderly, impoverished” woman — spells
the death of modern attention spans. Betty takes Ciccoricco into a detailed
discussion of the “cybernetic narrator” and “cybernetic
narration” – terms which, like those in the first chapter, work to
take account of the minds involved in the reading process: how is the fiction
produced or altered, and how therefore is the reader’s experience changed, in the
interaction between human and machine? Though YHCHI’s text works like speed-reading
software to leave no time for conscious readerly reflection, Ciccoricco persuasively
argues that “Betty Nkomo” is a kind of cybernetic loop, a
marriage of content and form: it self-consciously points to its demands on our
attention because the fact we are “require[d]” to pay extra attention is itself
part of the text’s meaning [
Ciccoricco 2015, 89].
The third chapter’s explication of the video game
Journey (2012) brings the
player, rather than the reader,
into cognitive literary studies. Though this chapter moves deftly between Gestalt
psychology, mythology, and the concept of narrative universals, the stakes of the
chapter are less clear and some of the limitations of the cognitive literary project
became particularly apparent here. At its weakest, this chapter tends to read far
more like the largely discredited sibling of cognitive literary studies: literary
Darwinism. Jonathan Kramnick remarked of literary Darwinism that it ultimately has
nothing to say about literary texts, “apart from what it would extract elsewhere from the
evolutionary psychological edifice (claims about mate selection or
aggression, for example)”
[
Kramnick 2011, 327]. Unlike the previous chapters, where Ciccoricco’s use of the cognitive
sciences to illuminate the minds of readers and characters felt appropriate and
persuasive, here the gestures to a larger evolutionary narrative are less so. When
discussing how
Journey’s players control a wordless
avatar who comes across other wordless avatars (controlled by other players), and
the ways in which they have to try and communicate, Ciccoricco offers a scientific
explanation of this phenomena: “The theory of inclusive fitness establishes the benefits of
social altruism among group members based on the greater likelihood of it
leading to the perpetuation of genes among one’s in-group […] we have the
obvious instinctual mandate to tend and befriend”
[
Ciccoricco 2015, 115]. The scientific explanation is not
wrong, but this mundane
evolutionary fact does not enrich our understanding of the text in the way that the
cognitive science in the previous chapters — which was at the scale of individual
human beings, not the whole species — did.
Ciccoricco begins the book’s second half on “Memory and
Emotion” with a chapter on Nicholson Baker’s
The
Mezzanine (1988), a novel about the digressing thoughts of the narrator,
Howie, on his lunch break. The chapter’s overarching discussion of the
reconstructive nature of memory is particularly interesting – in part because it
works as a persuasive example of how contemporary models of mind can inform our
understanding of character and memory in fiction, but also because Ciccoricco
establishes that Baker was likely engaged, to some extent, with the cognitive
science that was becoming more widely known at the time of writing, thus making such
a scientific reading of his work seem more warranted than it was in the
Journey chapter. Ciccoricco convincingly argues that as
the novel “explores Howie’s higher-minded meditations on the everyday,” Baker’s
footnotes, which are ultimately more substantial than the text from which they
digress, “animate[…] his lower-level cognitive activity”
[
Ciccoricco 2015, 128]. The novel thereby enacts the fact that most of what the mind does is largely
unconscious and, like the footnotes themselves, below the level of what we might
think of as our primary conscious narrative.
In the fifth chapter, Ciccoricco takes Judi Alston’s digital fiction
Nightingale’s Playground (2010) as an exemplary text in
order to demonstrate how literary study might approach memory in fiction by moving
away from the outdated Freudian model of repression. This digital fiction, in which
the central character, Carl, must “come to terms with the likelihood that his problematic
memories are false ones”
[
Ciccoricco 2015, 162] is educative because the marriage of its content and form raises interesting,
difficult questions about narration and reader-agency. Does the ambiguously
italicised text in this fiction represent thought or speech, from the present or
past? Is the digital space the reader navigates an objective reality or Carl’s
subjective reality? Grounding his discussion in the contemporary sciences of memory,
Ciccoricco demonstrates just how literary studies can benefit by departing from the
Freudian model in order to better read fictions such as
Nightingale’s Playground as enacting the “inescapably context-bound and eminently fallible nature of
human memory”
[
Ciccoricco 2015, 189].
The final chapter, in which Ciccoricco turns to the video game
God of War (2005), serves both as a defence of the merit of video games
and of the need to have a specific language to talk about their unique potential.
Through his reading of
God of War’s complex temporal
staging, Ciccoricco argues that video games, which are uniquely participatory, have
the potential not just to make the player “read the minds” of the characters
onscreen (as you would when passively watching a film), but also to make the player
enact the character’s conscious experience as they effectively live
the story
through that character. As he points out, “if we limit our model of player emotion to the effects of
[characters’] facial expressions […] then we have not gone any further than
treating a game as a kind of movie”
[
Ciccoricco 2015, 210]. Ciccoricco consequently addresses the potential criticism of
God of War as a game that has players enact rage and
violence. As in his discussion of attention span in Chapter Two, Ciccoricco points
to the tension in the game between “the murderous and the methodical, the need to battle and
the need to solve puzzles”
[
Ciccoricco 2015, 218], to undercut any prejudice the cognitive literary field might have that video
games are necessarily mindless.
Refiguring Minds in Narrative Media is an
excellent illustration of the strengths of cognitive literary studies, grounded as
it is in diligent research and deft movement between narratology and the
contemporary sciences of mind. It also shows some of the field’s weaknesses. Chapter
Three in particular reads, at times, more like a scientific paper which treats
Journey as evidence for its hypothesis
than as a piece of literary criticism informed by contemporary science. Part of the
problem with this chapter is that while Ciccoricco moves impressively between a
number of theorists and fields, the chapter is limited to a single game. Though the
other chapters are much stronger because they strike a better balance between art
and theory, they each share this problem to an extent. In the two chapters on video
games, for example, we are left wondering how we might apply a cognitive approach to
video games that aren’t in the third person, or are in entirely different genres?
Ciccoricco occasionally mentions some other games but his treatment of them is very
brief and does not tie significantly into the chapter’s larger discussion.
Similarly, in his discussion of The Mezzanine’s interesting
use of footnotes, Ciccoricco makes brief reference to other famous users of
footnotes (from Jorge Luis Borges to David Foster Wallace to Terry Pratchett) but
makes no mention of cognition in any of their works. Ciccoricco’s reading of Baker’s
novel is convincing, but the novel is only understood in isolation, with no sense of
the broader literary movements in which it plays a part. Ciccoricco’s book lays very
firm ground for a cognitive approach to old and new media. That one text per chapter
felt insufficient is a sign of the quality of its scientific and theoretical
research and of the extent to which it conceptually expands the field.